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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
SALVADOR TORRES-GARCIA, : Case No. 20040815-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of murder, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ann M. 
Boyden presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the trial court err by denying Torres-Garcia's motion to continue even 
though the State failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003)? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's decision to either grant or deny a continuance 
is clearly within its discretion" and will not be disturbed "absent a clear abuse of 
discretion/" State v. Tolano. 2001 UT App 37,^5,19 P.3d 400 (citation omitted). 
However, "[statutory interpretation presents a question of law; 'therefore, [this Court 
will] review the trial court's rulings for correctness and give no deference to its 
conclusions.5" State v. Casev. 2001 UT App 205,^5-6, 29 P.3d 25 (citations omitted). 
Issue II: In this homicide case, did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting 
evidence that Torres-Garcia possessed drugs and weapons unrelated to the homicide? 
Standard of Review: This Court will "review a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Fedorowicz. 2002 UT 67,f24, 52 P.3d 1194 (citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant Salvador Torres-Garcia's (Torres-Garcia) argument that the trial court 
erred by denying his motion to continue after the State failed to provide notice of its 
expert as required by section 77-17-13 is preserved at Court Record (R.) 255:4-16 
(Motion Hearing); and 256:8-16 (First Day of Trial). Torres-Garcia-s argument that the 
trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that Torres-Garcia possessed drugs 
and weapons unrelated to the homicide is preserved at R. 69-70 (Defendant's Motion in 
Limine); 84-92 (State's Memorandum in Opposition); 116-19 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law); 134-48 (Defendant's Motion to Reconsider); 254 (Motion in 
Limine Hearing); and 255:20-31 (Motion Hearing). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issues on appeal. Their 
text is provided in full at Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003); 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 401-Definition of relevant evidence; 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402-Irrelevant evidence inadmissible; 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403-Exclusion of relevant evidence; 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Torres-Garcia was charged with one count of murder, a first degree felony. R. 4-
5. Torres-Garcia's co-defendant, Eliazar Babluene-Para (Babluene-Para), was charged 
with one count of murder or, in the alternative, one count of felony murder. R. 260:20. 
On December 4, 2003, Torres-Garcia filed discovery requests for a "list of all the 
witnesses that the State intends to call for trial," and lf[p]ursuant to Utah Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), notice by the State of any other crimes, wrongs or acts it intends to 
attempt to use in its prosecution of this case, and a list of exhibits, and names and address 
of witnesses it intends to use to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts." R. 
15-17. A preliminary hearing was conducted on February 25, 2004. R. 34-35; 253. 
There, the State called Clara Irwin (Irwin), the wife of alleged victim Todd Irwin (Todd); 
Juan Carlos Delgado-Cruz (Delgado-Cruz); and Detective James Prior (Detective Prior). 
R. 253. The State asked Detective Prior if Torres-Garcia was "in the presence of drugs 
and guns when he was apprehended." R. 253:88. Detective Prior responded, "Within six 
feet, yes." Id The State did not call Craig Watson (Watson). R. 253. 
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On April 15, 2004, the State filed a Notice of Expert Witnesses, revealing its 
intent to call Watson, Assistant Chief Investigator for the District Attorney's Office. R. 
60-62; see Addendum C. The State said Watson would "testify concerning drug 
trafficking." IcL The notice contained a certificate of delivery signed by the prosecutor 
saying she had "caused a true and correct copy" of the notice "to be mailed to D. Richard 
Smith, Attorney for Defendant, at 4444 South 700 East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84107." Id Torres-Garcia was represented by the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
(LDA), 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. R. 7-8; 14. 
On May 17, 2004, Torres-Garcia filed a motion in limine to exclude "[testimony 
regarding the seizure of weapons and drugs at the time of Defendant's arrest" (drug and 
weapon evidence), pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 69-70. On 
May 20, 2004, the State filed a list of proposed witnesses. R. 105-06, 108-09. This list 
included Watson but did not identify him as an expert. Id. Also on May 20, the trial 
court held a hearing on Torres-Garcia 5s rule 404(b) motion. R. 254. Torres-Garcia 
argued the drug and weapon evidence was inadmissible because he was "charged with 
homicide" not possession; the drug and weapon evidence did not contain the drugs or 
weapon involved in the charged incident; and he had not yet been convicted of 
possessing the drugs or weapons and, in fact, had an argument that he did not 
constructively possess them. R. 254:8-15. The State argued the drug and weapon 
evidence was "relevant to show" Torres-Garcia had a "good" drug business and protected 
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"his business with the use of guns." IcL at 16. The trial court ruled the drug and weapon 
evidence was admissible even though it did not represent the "specific guns or specific 
drugs" involved in the case. Id. at 21-22; see Addendum D. Specifically, the trial court 
held the drug and weapon evidence was "directly probative of the defendant's intent, 
preparation, plan, lack of mistake, or accident" because it went "to the State's theory . . . 
that this murder was based on a drug deal that went very, very bad." R. 254:22. It also 
went to "proving identity." IcL at 23. Next, the trial court ruled the drug and weapon 
evidence was more probative than prejudicial because it "is not th[e] type of evidence" to 
"create hostility." Id. at 23-24. Finally, the trial court warned that the drug and weapon 
evidence could not be used to show Torres-Garcia was "a drug dealer, or to show that he 
[was] a murderer," and ordered the State to "prepare a jury instruction." IcL at 25. 
The State clarified that it intended to use the drug and weapon evidence to prove 
Torres-Garcia was "a drug dealer." IcL at 27. Specifically, the State said it intended to 
call Detective Prior to testify that he found the drug and weapon evidence and that the 
guns and drugs in the evidence were "not the same guns and drugs" used in the charged 
homicide; and "Watson, who is an expert in distribution," to show "that these are drugs 
in amounts of distribution." IcL The trial court then clarified that the State could admit 
the drug and weapon evidence through Detective Prior and show the drug and weapon 
evidence was "consistent with drug dealing" through Watson's testimony. IcL at 28. 
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On May 21, 2004, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
R. 116-19; see Addendum E. The trial court held the drug and weapon evidence was 
probative of "identity, intent, plan, preparation and lack of accident" because "the drugs 
and guns show a plan, a modis operandi, or scheme engaged in by defendant to conduct 
and protect a drug business." R. 118. Finally, "the evidence will not be more prejudicial 
than probative" because "the jury will already hear this evidence through the testimony of 
state's witnesses" and it will not "raise the jury to overmastering hostility." Id, 
On May 24, 2004, Torres-Garcia filed a motion to reconsider the rule 404(b) 
ruling. R. 134-48. At the motion hearing, Torres-Garcia initially raised an issue of 
"pressing urgency," regarding "an expert witness which the State indicates their intention 
to call." R. 255:4. "[F]or the first time Friday I learned that the State intended to call an 
expert witness." Id. The prosecutor "said that she had indeed filed notice some time 
back. And we reviewed the docket of the court and saw that some notice had been filed, 
at least according to the docket, on April 15th of this year. That being said, we still do not 
have it." Id at 4-5. Torres-Garcia then moved to continue because "[w]e cannot prepare 
to meet this expert or consider obtaining our own expert to counter their expert when . . . 
the requirements of. . . 77-17-13(l)(b)[] have no t . . . been followed completely." Id_ 
The State responded that it would use Watson's testimony for "the 404(b) 
evidence" and for its "case in chief." Id. at 7-8. Specifically, the State intended to call 
Watson to show the drug and weapon evidence indicated "distribution." IdL at 8. The 
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State then argued it gave "notice" and "Pm sorry [LDA has] a problem getting things to 
the right attorneys, but that's not the State's problem." IcL. Finally, the State argued it 
had fully complied with section 77-17-13(1) because its notice indicated "Watson would 
be used . . . as a distribution expert." Id. Torres-Garcia then noted that the State's 
explanation of Watson's testimony, even if he had received the notice, did not notify him 
"what it was we would have to be able to counter this person on." IcL at 11. Finally, the 
State revealed Watson was not involved in the investigation of Torres-Garcia's case and 
his name "was not part of the police reports" provided in discovery. IdL. at 12. 
After argument, the trial court asked Torres-Garcia if he needed a continuance. 
Id at 15; see Addendum F. Torres-Garcia responded: 
[W]e would require additional time. Still we would like to 
see some sort of summary. I think that maybe once we see 
that then there would be the necessity of having a Rimmasch 
hearing or the opportunity at least to consult an expert of our 
own in some sort of rebuttal. But, you know, we still don't 
know any more than what has been read into the record, that 
he's going to talk about drug trafficking. I think it needs to 
be fuller than that and I think, yes, we do, I guess depending 
what he says, especially, require additional time. 
R. 255:15-16. The trial court then granted Torres-Garcia's motion for a continuance: 
I believe that the response of defense counsel at that time was 
what I needed to have on the record before ruling that in fact 
the whole underlying purpose behind this kind of notice is 
expert testimony is so that the opposing party can counter 
expert testimony, whether that's through testimony of their 
own witnesses . . . , or a scientific reliability argument. And 
without any of that being done within the time frame that's 
necessary, what I'm working in the back of my mind is that 
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that information really was provided at the Thursday hearing 
and this testimony may not even be until Thursday of this 
week, but that undermines the purpose of the rule in notice 
and I need to rule that in fact the opposing party in this case 
has stated in good faith and I am satisfied that they would not 
be able to prepare to counter the expert testimony. 
Id. at 16. Next, the trial court denied Torres-Garcia's motion to reconsider its rule 404(b) 
ruling. Icl at 29-31. Finally, the State decided it would rather "go forward" with the trial 
and not call Watson. Id. at 33. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that with the "proffer by 
the State that they are going forward . . . without the expert testimony of [] Watson, then 
we will continue in the format that we are scheduled for tomorrow." Id_ 
On May 25, 2004, the first day of trial, the State filed a motion to reconsider the 
trial court's ruling as to Watson's expert testimony. R. 121; 256:8. The State argued, for 
the first time, that Watson's testimony fell under section 77-17-13(6). Id. In response, 
Torres-Garcia argued that subsection six "doesn't say that no notice at all must be given. 
It says . . . notice must be provided in the due course or regular process of discovery such 
that it would put us on notice and that the person there would be contemplated as a 
witness and give us an opportunity to question that person." R. 256:9. "[W]e didn't 
receive any notice, we weren't aware that this person was contemplated as a witness prior 
to last Thursday when his name was mentioned in conjunction with our motion in 
limine." Id. at 9-10. "We have the police reports. There is no report from Watson. So 
that's not really fair to say that that puts us on notice." Id. at 11. 
The trial court then ruled: 
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[I]t is clear that the ruling that I made yesterday was based on a 
notice requirement that is not required as to [] Watson. I am 
modifying my ruling. The testimony of [] Watson has been 
clearly given through general discovery as well as through the 
motions that have been discussed at length in court and briefed 
at length in court. 
Also, this is the first day of what is scheduled to be a 
four-day jury trial. I am going to order that the State not call 
that witness . . . until defense has had an opportunity to speak 
with him during the course of this trial. That may mean that 
the attorneys have to do some work outside the trial time. That 
is simply a given in a homicide trial. 
This homicide trial now needs to be everyone's first 
priority. There are not going to be explanations given that 
attorneys need to be in different courts or that they didn't have 
an opportunity to speak with the witness. The witness is here, 
the witness is available, and I am ordering him available to all 
three of the defense counsel so that they may fully and 
completely brief him and get an understanding of what his 
testimony is and prepare for that cross-examination. 
But because subsection 6 clearly states that the rule in 
subsection 1(b) does not apply to this particular witness, I am 
modifying that order. But there still needs to be reasonable 
notice, there still needs to be a reasonable opportunity for the 
opposing party to prepare, and that is to occur this week during 
trial before I will allow [] Watson to be called to the stand. 
Id. at 14-16; see Addendum G. In response to the trial court's questioning, the State said 
it intended to call Watson at "the end of tomorrow." R. 256:16. Consequently, the trial 
court ruled "the opposing parties are on notice that they need to get that preparation and 
discussion done tonight, and that will be expected." Id. 
The trial court next considered the admissibility of Irwin's eyewitness testimony. 
R. 256:24. Torres-Garcia argued Irwin's identification was unreliable because she 
observed the incident while high on cocaine, severely sleep deprived, and under a 
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heightened sense of anxiety; and her statements were inconsistent. Id. at 26-27. While 
arguing, Torres-Garcia noted that Irwin had a "heightened sense of anxiety, that coupled 
with the drugs in her system or maybe the State's expert is also an expert on the drugs, 
how they affect perception, I don't know." Id. at 27. Finally, the trial court considered 
the exclusionary rule. Id, at 34. Torres-Garcia argued Watson should be excluded 
because he was being called to discuss "the broader meaning" of the drug and weapon 
evidence and his presence in the courtroom would "bolster his testimony." Id_ The State 
responded that Watson was "being called to also testify about drug trafficking in 
general." Id The trial court allowed Watson to remain. Id. 
Following jury selection, the parties gave opening statements. In his opening 
statement, Torres-Garcia said Irwin: 
has given various statements at various times concerning this 
incident. She is an eyewitness in this case. , . . 
And I've prepared a chart also. There's a few things 
that are important to pay attention to, many things, but I'm 
going to highlight some of them and suggest to you that the 
answers should maybe be consistent from somebody who was 
present. But listen to the answers, listen to what [Irwin] says 
about the answers she gave at different times and if those 
answers change or not: How many people entered the room, 
the description of-those people, the description of the shooter, 
was he tall, was he short, was he heavy , was he old, was he 
young, what happened leading up to the shooting, the actual 
behavior in the room. You heard about someone being struck 
in the head with a gun. Listen to that. 
Importantly, most importantly, the name of the shooter 
and whether she knew this person or not or had ever seen him 
before. The description of the shooter, who left the room, 
when they left the room, and how they left after they left the 
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room. And there's different cars that will be described and 
different people going to different cars and a very important 
description of who left in which vehicle. 
Ladies and gentlemen, for the reasons I've alluded to 
and many others,... it's going to be apparent to you that 
there are huge discrepancies and deficiencies in the evidence. 
R. 256:147-50. 
The State then called Irwin as its first witness. IdL. at 152. Irwin was examined 
and cross-examined on the first day of trial. Id. at 152-218. The State presented its 
remaining witnesses on May 26, 2004, the second day of trial. R. 258. As Torres-Garcia 
cross-examined the State's witnesses, he created and displayed a diagram of the 
discrepancies in Irwin's testimony. R. 258:256-61, 349-54, 368. This diagram included 
Irwin's contradictory statements about whether Todd demanded money or drugs in 
exchange for the heroin, Irwin's various names for the shooter, and Irwin's testimony 
that the shooter drove the gold car Delgado-Cruz normally drove. IcL_ During his 
testimony, Detective Prior introduced the drug and weapon evidence. IcL_ at 293-99. As 
its final witness, the State called Watson to provide his expert testimony. IJL at 427-42. 
At the end of trial, Torres-Garcia objected to the rule 404(b) jury instruction 
because "it possibly draws more attention to it." R. 258:459. The trial court overruled 
this objection. IdL at 459-60. Torres-Garcia renewed his objection the next day, arguing 
a rule 404(b) cautionary instruction is not mandatory. R. 259:477-78. The trial court 
again overruled Torres-Garcia's objection. Id. at 479. It then instructed the jury: 
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The State has introduced evidence of other alleged wrongs or 
acts attributed to the defendant that he is not charged with in 
the Information in this case. You may use this evidence to 
show the defendant's identity, motive, plan, preparation, 
knowledge, intent, opportunity, or absence of accident as to 
the crimes that have been charged in the Information. You 
may consider this evidence relating to other acts from the 
witnesses today solely for the purposes that I've just 
explained and may not draw from such evidence the 
inference that the defendant has a character trait that 
establishes he probably acted in conformity with that trait. 
Proof that the defendant has engaged in a drug business may 
not be used to show that the defendant is not a truthful person 
or that he is a murderer. 
R. 194; 259:486. 
In closing, the State argued, "Why, you say, would somebody kill someone over 
$20? Well, it's more than that. It's to make a point. It's to let people know, you don't 
mess with me. I have a drug business, I will protect it, you don't mess with me. That's 
what this was about." R. 259:487, 527-28. Later, in rebuttal, the State argued, "Told yc 
the shooting isn't so much over two or three versus five balloons, it's over[] you don't 
mess with me, you don't hold my drugs hostage." Id. at 538. Following argument, 
Torres-Garcia moved "for mistrial based on violation" of the trial court's rule 404(b) 
ruling. Id. at 551. "In both parts of her closing argument, the prosecutor indicated well 
beyond what was allowed by this court as to the significance" of the drug and weapon 
evidence. LI The trial court denied Torres-Garcia's motion. Id^ at 552. 
The jury began deliberation at 12:40 p.m. on May 27, 2004. R. 259:549; 260:4. 
At 5:50 pm, "the jury sent out a written question." R. 158; 260:4. The question read, 
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'"Can we consider what defense attorneys said in an opening statement as evidence? If 
so, can we get a copy of opening statements?"1 Id. The trial court responded in writing, 
"'No. Look to Instruction No. 7. No statement or argument of the attorneys is, itself, 
evidence. Also, Instruction No. 5 explains your responsibility as jurors to determine the 
facts from the evidence.'" Id. The jury ended deliberation on May 27 at 8:30 pm and 
began deliberation again at 9:00 am on May 28. R. 260:5-6. At 9:30 am on May 28, the 
jury "sent out another written question." Id_ at 6. This question read, "'Could we see 
Officer Ricks' testimony, his initial report if you have it?'" R. 159; 260:6. The trial court 
responded in writing, "'Jurors need to rely on their collective memory of the evidence. 
No more reports or documents or evidence after the jury has the case.'" R. 159; 260:7. 
At 11:00 am, the jury informed the bailiff that "there was no motion going forward. That 
they weren't speaking and they . . . felt like they were reaching an impasse." R. 260:7. 
At 2:20 pm on May 28, the jury reached a verdict. Id. at 18. The jury convicted Torres-
Garcia of one count of murder and found Babluene-Para not guilty. Id_ at 20-21. 
On August 23, 2004, the trial court sentenced Torres-Garcia to five years to life in 
the Utah State Prison and ordered the sentence to run "consecutively with the prison 
sentence now serving at Utah State Prison." R. 229-30. On September 20, 2004, Torres-
Garcia filed a notice of appeal. R. 233-34. The Utah Supreme Court transferred Torres-
Garcia's case to this Court on October 14, 2004. R. 244. Torres-Garcia is incarcerated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, Irwin testified she and Todd were staying at the Dream Inn. R. 256:153. 
She and Todd had a "drug problem." Id. at 155. She prostituted herself to get money for 
cocaine. Id. at 157-58. She had prostituted herself to Delgado-Cruz at least "twice." Id_ 
at 157-58, 180-81. On September 23, 2003, she called her contact, Fernando, for more 
drugs. IcL at 156-57. Delgado-Cruz delivered the drugs to her hotel room. Ld. at 157. 
Delgado-Cruz, as usual, was driving a gold Nissan. Id. at 182. While Delgado-Cruz was 
there, a police officer parked behind Delgado-Cruz's car. Id_ at 159. After the officer 
left, Delgado-Cruz "slipped" a baggie of balloons containing heroin into Todd's shoe and 
left. Id at 161. Irwin called Fernando and told him that Delgado-Cruz had left the 
heroin. Id at 161-63. Fernando told Irwin he would give her "three balloons of white 
for returning the package." IcL at 163. Todd "grabbed the phone" and said, "I don't want 
three, I want five. You don't give me five, I'll flush them down the toilet." IcL 
Irwin agreed to meet Delgado-Cruz at a nearby gas station to return the heroin. Id 
at 164. Todd went in Irwin's place. Id. Todd returned fifteen minutes later with the 
heroin and said, "Well, [Delgado-Cruz] told me he didn't have . . . what I wanted, so I 
told him he couldn't have what he wanted." Id. at 164-65. Fifteen minutes later, 
someone knocked at the door. IcL at 167. Todd opened the door and five or six men 
entered. Id at 167-69. One of the men hit Todd over the head with a gun and "Todd 
handed him the stuff." Id. at 169-70. The man hit Todd again and said, "This ain't all of 
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it." Id at 170. Then Irwin "heard a gunshot" and the men "ran out." Id. at 170-71. 
Irwin followed the men and saw the shooter drive away in the gold Nissan. Id_ at 171. 
On cross-examination, Irwin admitted she had twice pleaded guilty to providing false 
information to a police officer. Id. at 177. She also admitted that just prior to the 
incident she had been ingesting cocaine and foregoing sleep for at least two days. Id. at 
196-97. This caused her to "nod off and have "a difficult time telling" Detective Prior 
what happened when he interviewed her that night. IcL Further, she admitted that she 
"heard the gunshot" but did not see the shot fired. Id. at 203-04. 
Officer Sonny Ricks testified that he interviewed Irwin at the scene of the 
incident. R. 258:242. Irwin told him six men entered the hotel room and two were 
carrying guns. Id at 243. She did not know any of the men. Id. She identified 
"Miguel" as her contact but not as the shooter. Id. at 245-46. 
Detective Prior testified he interviewed Irwin at the scene, at the police station on 
the night of the incident, and on November 13. R. 258:266-67. At the first interview, 
Irwin did not identify the shooter. IcL at 312-13. She explained "what had happened" 
and identified "Miguel" as her contact but not as the shooter. Id_ at 313, 319-20. At the 
second interview, Irwin said Todd asked for money, not drugs, in exchange for the 
heroin. Id at 323. She said six people entered the hotel room and "they started hitting" 
Todd. Id. at 275, 304, 326. Two of the men were carrying guns. Id. at 328. In 
response to Detective Prior's question, "One of these people you know as [Delgado-
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Cruz] or Miguel?" Irwin said yes. Id. Thereafter, Irwin said she did not see Delgado-
Cruz in the hotel room and identified Miguel as the shooter. IdL at 270, 277, 330-31. 
Early in the interview, Irwin said four people left in a red SUV and two, Delgado-Cruz 
and someone else, left in the gold Nissan. IdL_ at 327. Later in the interview, Irwin said 
Miguel and someone else left in the gold Nissan. Id. at 334, 354. 
At the third interview, Irwin said six people entered the hotel room. R. 258:275, 
370. She said she could not remember what the shooter looked like but might be able to 
pick him out of a photo array. IcL at 370-71. She identified the shooter as Fernando. Id. 
at 271, 373. She said Fernando, Mario, and Miguel were the same person, her contact. 
Id. at 373, 377. She initially said she had never seen or met Fernando. IdL at 374. Later, 
she said she had met Fernando "a couple of times." IdL at 375. Detective Prior produced 
a photo array and told Irwin, among other admonitions, that he had "reason to believe 
that one of the people pictured in this group of photographs may in fact be one of the 
people associated with this incident." IcL at 376. Irwin selected Torres-Garcia. Id. at 
172, 279. Irwin later identified Torres-Garcia at a lineup. Id. at 172, 286. At the 
preliminary hearing, Irwin testified she did not know the shooter's name. IdL at 273. 
Delgado-Cruz testified that Mario and Fernando employed him as a drug runner. 
R. 258:398. He identified Torres-Garcia as Mario and Babluene-Para as Fernando. Id_ at 
399. He said he had sexual relations with Irwin but never paid her for it. IcL at 411-13. 
Todd was not "pleased with him" and gave him dirty looks. Id. at 411, 414. Delgado-
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Cruz and his brother-in-law drove the gold Nissan to the Dream Inn. Id, at 404. Mario, 
Fernando, and a third man arrived in the SUV. Id_ at 404. Mario and the third man 
carried guns. Id. at 405. Mario, Fernando, and the third man entered the hotel room. IdL 
Delgado-Cruz saw Mario and the third man hit and kick Todd. Id_ at 418. He heard a 
gunshot but did not see who fired the gun. Id. at 418. He got in the gold Nissan and 
"Mario got in too." IcL at 405, 420. On cross-examination, Cruz admitted he had been 
arrested for selling drugs and was hoping to get a better deal for testifying. Id, at 407-10, 
420. Detective Prior testified that Delgado-Cruz said during an interview that he drove 
the gold Nissan from the Dream Inn with his brother-in-law as a passenger, and that 
Mario, Fernando, and the third man left in the SUV. Id. at 288, 363-64, 366. 
Detective Prior testified that, based on information Delgado-Cruz provided during 
the interview, officers executed search warrants on two residences. R. 258:290, 406. 
Torres-Garcia and a woman occupied one of the residences. IJL at 290-94. The landlord 
identified Torres-Garcia as the renter. Id. at 291-92. Officers found the drug and 
weapon evidence in a closet. Id. at 293-99. Detective Prior testified that the drug and 
weapon evidence included: cocaine; a bag of pistols and ammunition, including .45 
caliber pistol rounds but no .45 caliber pistol; a small electronic scale; a "Seal-a-Meal"; 
"small party balloons"; $8,000 in cash; and several cell phones. IdL The cocaine (five 
"fist-sized packages") and bag of weapons were produced at trial. Id. at 293-97. 
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Watson testified the drug and weapon evidence indicated street- to mid-level drug 
distribution. R. 258:434-36. He also testified drug dealers typically have "multiple cars" 
and runners do not use the same cars; drug users typically use "monetary amounts to 
represent the amount of drugs they want"; and drug dealers typically use nicknames and 
change their names "[e]very time they answer the phone." IcL at 437-38. On cross-
examination, Torres-Garcia asked Watson one question: "Neither of these two 
individuals are charged with dealing drugs?" IdL at 442. Watson replied no. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision to admit Watson's expert 
testimony without granting Torres-Garcia a continuance because the trial court erred by 
holding section 77-17-13(6) applied, and abused its discretion by denying Torres-
Garcia's request for a continuance under section 77-17-13(1). The trial court erred by 
concluding subsection six applied. Section 77-17-13 was enacted to ensure a defendant 
receives enough time and information to adequately prepare to meet adverse expert 
testimony. The plain language of subsection six says a defendant receives enough time 
to prepare to meet the expert testimony if he receives reasonable notice of the expert 
through general discovery. Here, the trial court erred by ruling subsection six applied 
because the State did not provide reasonable notice of Watson's testimony through 
general discovery. The trial court also abused its discretion by denying Torres-Garcia's 
request for a continuance under subsection one. Subsection one requires the State to give 
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notice of expert testimony at least 30 days before trial. Here, the State did not give the 
required notice. Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Torres-
Garcia's request for a continuance because he was prepared for trial, his need for a 
continuance would have been met by granting the continuance, his right to a fair trial 
outweighed any inconvenience, and the trial court's order prejudiced his case. 
Second, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting the drug and weapon evidence. Rule 404(b) says evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident. In this case, the gun and weapon evidence was not admissible 
under rule 404(b) because it was not offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, it was 
not relevant except to show Torres-Garcia had a proclivity to commit the crime charged, 
and its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. Moreover, the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
Third, this Court should reverse because the cumulative effect of the trial court's 
errors undermines confidence that Torres-Garcia had a fair trial. This Court will reverse 
if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was 
had. Here, the trial court prejudiced Torres-Garcia's case by denying him a continuance 
to prepare to meet Watson's testimony and admitting the drug and weapon evidence. 
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Taken cumulatively, these errors undermined Torres-Garcia's defense. Watson's 
testimony explained away the discrepancies in Irwin's testimony on which Torres-Garcia 
had built his defense. Watson's testimony also gave expert endorsement to the State's 
characterization of Torres-Garcia as a dangerous drug dealer who harbored weapons for 
the purpose of killing anyone who interfered in his drug business. But because the State 
did not give Torres-Garcia notice of Watson's testimony and the trial court denied 
Torres-Garcia motion to continue, Torres-Garcia was forced to leave Watson's testimony 
virtually uncross-examined, thereby solidifying its validity for the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY DENYING TORRES-GARCIA'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 77-17-13 
This Court should reverse the trial court's decision to admit Watson's expert 
testimony without granting Torres-Garcia a continuance because the trial court: (A) erred 
by holding section 77-17-13(6) applied, and (B) abused its discretion by denying Torres-
Garcia's request for a continuance when the State failed to provide notice of Watson's 
testimony under section 77-17-13(1) and the lack of notice prejudiced Torres-Garcia. 
A, The Trial Court Erred Bv Concluding Section 77-17-13(6) Applied. 
Section 77-17-13 was enacted to ensure a defendant receives enough time and 
information Mto adequately prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." State v. Arellano, 
964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The notice requirements allow a defendant 
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to "prepare to challenge" the expert testimony, "plan[] for effective cross-examination," 
"consult with his own expert," "obtain[] rebuttal testimony," and "incorporate any new 
information into the defense strategy." Id. at 1169 n. 2, 1171 (citations omitted); see 
State v. Rothlisberger. 2004 UT App 226,f 31, 95 P.3d 1193 (holding expert notice 
allows defendant to "prepare a witness-specific response to that testimony"), cert. 
granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS 248 (Utah 2004); Tolano. 2001 UT App 37 at [^12 
(explaining expert notice gives defendant "opportunity to examine the testing 
procedures," "hire his own expert to challenge the testing procedures," "examine the 
resumes," and "possibly impugn their qualifications"). 
In most cases, formal notice is necessary. These cases are governed by subsection 
one. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1). In a few cases, formal notice is not necessary 
because the circumstances of the case itself provide adequate notice of the State's expert. 
The Utah Legislature has accounted for these cases by listing exceptions to subsection 
one's formal notice requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)-(6). One such 
exception is subsection six, which says the State is not required to give formal notice of: 
an expert who is an employee of the state or its political 
subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on reasonable 
notice through general discovery that the expert may be 
called as a witness at trial, and the witness is made available 
to cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon 
reasonable notice. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(6). 
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Utah appellate courts have not yet interpreted subsection six. When interpreting a 
statute, this Court will "seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the 
purpose the act was meant to achieve." State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,f7, 31 P.3d 528 
(quotations and citation omitted). In doing so, "this [C]ourt looks first to the statute's 
plain language to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose . . . reading] the plain 
language of the statute as a whole." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sundance Dev. 
Corp., 2003 UT App 367,% 78 P.3d 995 (quotations and citations omitted). 
By enacting subsection six, the Utah Legislature intended to excuse the State from 
subsection one's formal notice requirements only where "the general discovery provided 
by the state gives notice that the expert may be used." Rep. K. Bryson, sponsor, speaking 
on floor of Utah House of Representatives, H.B. 238, 55 A Leg., Day 40, February 28, 
2003 (Tape 2, Counter 0839). This intention is clear from the plain language of the 
statute. The plain language of subsection six says it only applies where the defendant "is 
on reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a witness 
at trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). 
Reasonable notice under subsection six is notice that gives the defendant 
information similar to information he would have received under subsection one. See 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2003 UT App 367 at %4 (holding appellate court will 
interpret statute by "read[ing] the plain language of the statute as a whole" (quotations 
and citations omitted)); Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170 (holding section 77-17-13 was 
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enacted to ensure defendant receives enough time and information "to adequately prepare 
to meet adverse expert testimony"). Subsection six simply allows the State to forgo 
formal notice where notice is adequately given through discovery. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-13(6). Thus, reasonable notice under subsection six is notice that informs the 
defendant of the name, address, and qualifications of the expert; that the State intends to 
call the expert as a witness; and of the substance of the expert's testimony. See. Utah 
Code Ann. $ 77-17-13(1)0)): see Rothlisberger. 2004 UT App 226 at fp0-31 (holding 
notice must be "witness-specific"). Similarly, requiring the notice to be given through 
general discovery guarantees that a defendant receiving notice under subsection six, like 
a defendant receiving notice under subsection one, has adequate time to prepare to meet 
the expert testimony. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) (requiring State to give 
notice "as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial"). As explained by 
rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State must provide general 
discovery "as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant 
is required to plead." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b). Thus, reasonable notice through general 
discovery, like formal notice under subsection one, is notice that ensures a defendant 
enough time and information "to adequately prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." 
Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170; Tolano, 2001 UT App 37 at [^12 (explaining notice under 
section 77-17-13 gives defendant opportunity to examine testing procedures, hire own 
expert, examine resumes, and possibly impugn qualifications). 
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In this case, the trial court ruled the requirements of subsection six were met 
because the "testimony of [] Watson has been clearly given through general discovery." 
R. 256:15. This conclusion misinterprets subsection six. Although the State provided 
general discovery, including police reports, to Torres-Garcia, it did not disclose Watson's 
name or potential testimony in that discovery. R. 255:12; 256:11. Thus, the State did not 
provide reasonable notice of Watson's testimony through general discovery as required 
by the plain language of subsection six. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). In fact, the 
State itself recognized its general discovery disclosures did not provide reasonable notice 
of Watson's testimony. This is evidenced by the fact that it attempted to file formal 
notice under subsection one and repeatedly referenced its formal notice filing as the 
reason Torres-Garcia had adequate notice to prepare his defense. R. 60-62; 121; see 
Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171 n. 3 (holding State's argument that defendant should have 
inferred its intention to call expert from expert's name on toxicolgy report was "belied by 
the fact that [State] did finally make at least a partial disclosure, albeit twenty-five days 
late, something that it would not have done if it were truly obvious that [expert] was an 
indispensable witness" (interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995)). 
The trial court also ruled the requirements of subsection six were met because the 
"testimony of [] Watson has been clearly given through . . . the motions that have been 
discussed . . . and briefed at length in court." R. 256:15. This is a misinterpretation of 
subsection six. The first time Torres-Garcia received "any notice" of the State's intent to 
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call Watson was when the State "mentioned" Watson's name at the motion hearing held 
five days before trial. Id at 9-10. This notice did not satisfy subsection six's 
requirement that reasonable notice be given through general discovery. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-13(6); see Utah R. Crim. P. 16 (requiring State to provide general discovery "as 
soon as practicable following the filing of charges"); Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170 (holding 
section 77-17-13 was enacted to ensure defendant receives enough time "to adequately 
prepare to meet adverse expert testimony"). Besides, when Torres-Garcia subsequently 
objected that he had not received notice of Watson's testimony, the trial court ruled 
Watson's testimony would not be admitted. R. 255:16. Thus, Torres-Garcia had no 
reason to suspect Watson would testify until the first day of trial, when the State moved 
the trial court to reconsider its ruling under subsection six. R. 121; 256:8. Accordingly, 
the trial court misinterpreted subsection six. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Torres-Garcia's Request 
For a Continuance Under Subsection One, 
As explained above, section 77-17-13 was enacted to ensure a defendant receives 
enough time and information "to adequately prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." 
Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170. Subsection one ensures adequate notice by enacting formal 
notice requirements. See Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(1). Subsection one requires the 
State, if it "intends to call any expert to testify in a felony case," to give notice "as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial." Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(l)(a). 
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Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the 
expert's curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed 
testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate 
notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to 
cooperatively consult with the opposing party on reasonable 
notice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(b). If the State "fails to substantially comply with the 
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial 
prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the t r ia l . . . sufficient to allow preparation to 
meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a). 
This Court has outlined five factors for determining whether a trial court abused 
its discretion by denying a defendant's motion to continue. See. State v. Begishe, 937 
P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). These factors are: 
(1) the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready 
his defense prior to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood 
that the need for a continuance could have been met if the 
continuance had been granted; (3) the extent to which 
granting the continuance would have inconvenienced the 
court and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the 
appellant might have suffered harm as a result of the court's 
denial. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
For example, in Begishe. the State provided notice their expert would testify about 
seminal fluid but not that the expert would testify about human blood. Begishe . 937 P.2d 
at 528. At trial, the defendant moved to continue. IcL_ The trial court denied defendant's 
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motion but refused "to allow the State's expert to testify until appellant procured his own 
expert and ran independent tests, thus giving appellant two evenings to prepare to meet 
the new testimony." IcL On appeal, this Court held the trial court abused its discretion. 
Id. at 530-31. First, defendant was "folly prepared" for trial. IdL. at 530. Second, 
defendant "needed the continuance to fully analyze the new data." Id. Under the trial 
court's ruling, defendant was forced to find an "expert hastily" and "did not even have 
time to conduct additional testing." Id. Third, the State's tardy notice justified "any 
inconvenience" it suffered by the continuance and any inconvenience to the trial court or 
jury was outweighed by defendant's "right to a fair trial." IcL_ at 530-31. Fourth, 
defendant was prejudiced because his "expert was unable to conduct additional testing." 
Id. Plus, the "last minute testing precluded the appellant from formulating a trial strategy 
best calculated to address the totality of the State's case." IdL. "In her opening statement, 
[defense counsel] emphasized that the State had no inculpatory physical evidence. 
However, in her closing argument, appellant's trial counsel had to counter the physical 
evidence which the State actually produced and argued alternative reasons for blood 
appearing." Id "It is likely defense counsel's credibility in the eyes of the jury was 
greatly compromised by the prosecution's having introduced evidence of the blood test 
after she assured them the State had no physical evidence supporting the charge." IcL 
Similarly, in Tolano, the State failed to provide notice of its intent to call two 
experts to "identify the white powder" as controlled substances. Tolano, 2001 UT App 
27 
37 at p . Defendant moved to continue but the trial court denied defendant's motion. I(L 
at 1fl[3-4. On appeal, this Court held the trial court abused its discretion. IcL at ^8-15. 
First, defendant "exercised appropriate diligence" in preparing for trial. Id . at *fll 1. He 
"interviewed witnesses," "made arrangements to have witnesses," "extensively cross-
examined most of the State's witnesses," "made a chart outlining the area where the 
alleged offense occurred," and "arranged for an interpreter when necessary." Id. Second, 
defendant "could have been more adequately prepared to meet the expert testimony if the 
trial court had granted the continuance" because a continuance would have given 
defendant an "opportunity to examine the testing procedures," "hire his own expert," 
"examine the resumes," and "possibly impugn their qualifications." Id. at f^ 12. Third, 
defendant's "right to a fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court, the opposing 
party, and the jury that may have been caused by the continuance." Id. at ^13. Fourth, 
defendant was prejudiced because the State "inappropriately hindered" defendant's 
ability to refute the experts' testimony and the experts were "the only evidence 
establishing that the powder in the packages was a controlled substance." Id_ at ^ 15. 
In this case, the State failed to satisfy the requirements of subsection one. Under 
subsection one, the State was required to give notice of Watson's testimony at least "30 
days before trial." Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(l)(a). Although the State filed notice 
with the trial court, it did not serve notice on Torres-Garcia. R. 60-62. Instead, it served 
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notice on an attorney not representing Torres-Garcia.1 IdL Moreover, the trial court 
abused its discretion by initially granting but later denying Torres-Garcia's request for a 
continuance. Five days before trial, the trial court recognized Torres-Garcia was entitled 
to a continuance under subsection one because he needed time to prepare. R. 255:16. 
On the first day of trial, however, the trial court reversed its ruling under subsection six 
and allowed Watson to testify without a continuance. R. 256:14-16. Rather than 
considering Torres-Garcia's need for a continuance, as it considered before, the trial 
court simply ordered the State not to call Watson until the second day of trial. Id. This 
order, the trial court concluded, would allow Torres-Garcia to brief Watson during 
recesses, "get an understanding" of Watson's testimony, and "prepare for [Watson's] 
1
 This issue is preserved. An issue is properly preserved if "'"the court is afforded 
an opportunity to rule on the issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). Even though the trial court did not 
specifically observe that the State mailed its notice of expert testimony to the wrong 
attorney, it carefully considered Torres-Garcia's motion for a continuance based on the 
State's failure to give notice of Watson's testimony. R. 255:4-16. Torres-Garcia claimed 
throughout the discussion that he never received notice and, based on this argument, the 
trial court initially granted Torres-Garcia's motion for a continuance. Id. The fact that 
the certificate of delivery is addressed to the wrong attorney simply confirms Torres-
Garcia's claim that he never received notice and the trial court's ruling that Torres-Garcia 
needed a continuance. R. 60-62. When the trial court later changed its ruling, it did so 
only because it misinterpreted the language of subsection six. R. 256:8-16; see_ supra 
Part I. A. Besides, even if the issue was not preserved, this Court should reverse because 
the trial court's error was plain. Error is plain if it "should have been obvious to the trial 
court" and was prejudicial. State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74,TJ13, 10 P.3d 346 (citation 
omitted). In this case, the trial court's error was obvious because the trial court, unlike 
Torres-Garcia, received the State's notice of expert testimony and accompanying faulty 
certificate of delivery. R. 60-62. It was also prejudicial. See supra Part LB. 
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cross-examination." IdL As demonstrated by the four factors delineated by this Court, 
the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion. 
First, Torres-Garcia was "fully prepared" for trial. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 528. As 
demonstrated in his opening statement, Torres-Garcia had prepared a defense that 
consisted of highlighting the "huge discrepancies" in Irwin's testimony and arguing the 
discrepancies were explained by Irwin's inattention during the incident due to the large 
amounts of cocaine in her system, her prolonged lack of sleep, and the intense stress of 
the situation; and by her loyalty to Delgado-Cruz. R. 256:147-50. To support this 
defense, Torres-Garcia had "prepared a chart" listing Irwin's inconsistent statements and 
had prepared cross-examinations that would highlight the discrepancies in Irwin's 
testimony. R. 256:147-50, 176-214; R. 258:250-61, 300-76, 389-92, 407-420, 424-25. 
Thus, the need for a continuance "was the fault of the prosecution, not [Torres-Garcia]." 
Begishe. 937 P.2d at 530. 
Second, Torres-Garcia's need for a continuance would have been met if the trial 
court had granted the continuance. Torres-Garcia "needed a continuance to fully 
analyze" Watson's testimony and its effect on his defense. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530. 
Even though the trial court recognized recesses are busy in homicide trials and the 
recesses in this case would be particularly busy because defense counsel for both Torres-
Garcia and Babluene-Para needed to interview Watson, the trial court limited Torres-
Garcia's time to prepare to meet Watson's testimony to the evening recess between the 
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first and second day of trial. R. 256:14-16. Not only did this require Torres-Garcia to 
prepare his cross-examination of Watson in extreme haste, it also ignored Torres-
Garcia's need to examine Watson's testimony and curriculum vitae, challenge the 
scientific reliability of Watson's testimony, consult his own expert, and, most important, 
incorporate the information he learned into his trial strategy. See Tolano, 2001 UT App 
37 at [^12; Begishe, 937 P.3d at 530. A continuance was especially important in this case 
because Torres-Garcia had no accurate description of Watson's testimony. R. 60-62; 
255:8; 256:27, 34. Although the State initially said Watson would only testify that the 
drug and weapon evidence signified drug trafficking, it clarified on the first day of trial 
that Watson would testify about f,drug trafficking in general.11 R. 256:34. In fact, the 
State itself implied Torres-Garcia needed a continuance if its subsection one filing was 
faulty by arguing defense counsel "should have been able to prepare for [Watson's] 
testimony1' based on the subsection one notice filed over a month before trial. R. 121. 
Third, the State's failure to provide notice of Watson's testimony as required by 
subsection one justified "any inconvenience" the State would have suffered by a 
continuance. R. 60-62; see Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530. Moreover, Torres-Garcia's "right 
to a fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court, the opposing party, and the jury 
that may have been caused by a continuance." Tolano, 2001 UT App 37 at ^[13. 
Fourth, the trial court's order prejudiced Torres-Garcia because it prevented him 
"from formulating a trial strategy best calculated to address the totality of the State's 
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case." Begishe. 937 P.2d at 531. In his opening statement, Torres-Garcia emphasized 
the "huge discrepancies" in Irwin's testimony and argued these discrepancies revealed 
that Irwin's identification was not reliable. R. 256:147-50. Torres-Garcia then 
proceeded to cross-examine the State's witnesses consistent with his opening statement. 
R. 256:176-214; 258:250-61, 300-92, 407-425. As he cross-examined each witness, 
Torres-Garcia carefully highlighted the discrepancies in Irwin's testimony, including her 
inconsistent statements about whether Todd asked for money or drugs in exchange for 
the heroin, her testimony that Delgado-Cruz usually drove the gold Nissan and the 
shooter drove the gold Nissan after the shooting, and her use of different names to 
identify the shooter. Id Throughout cross-examination, Torres-Garcia displayed and 
referred to a chart listing the discrepancies in Irwin's testimony. Id. 
Following Torres-Garcia's extensive cross-examination of the State's witnesses, 
the State called Watson. R. 258:434. Watson initially testified about the drug and gun 
evidence. Id. at 434-35. Watson, however, went on to resolve the discrepancies Torres-
Garcia had highlighted in Irwin's testimony. Id. at 436-40. Specifically, Watson 
testified that drug dealers keep multiple cars and runners do not always use the same car; 
drug users use "monetary amounts to represent the amount of drugs they want"; and drug 
dealers use nicknames and change their nicknames "[e]very time they answer the phone." 
Id. By so testifying, Watson "greatly compromised" Torres-Garcia's "credibility in the 
eyes of the jury." Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531. The jury obviously remembered and 
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considered Torres-Garcia's opening statement because it, during deliberation, asked for a 
copy of the opening statement to review. R. 158; 260:4. Had Torres-Garcia been 
granted a continuance and been allowed the opportunity to fully explore Watson's 
testimony, he would have learned Watson could explain the discrepancies on which he 
was basing his defense. R. 258:434-40. Accordingly, he could have examined Watson's 
testimony for scientific reliability, examined Watson's expert qualifications, prepared to 
challenge Watson's explanation of Irwin's discrepancies, planned effective cross-
examination to refute Watson's claims, consulted another expert about the discrepancies, 
or obtained rebuttal testimony. See R. 255:14-16. At the very least, Torres-Garcia could 
have altered his trial strategy so as to avoid having the credibility of his defense so 
directly attacked by the State's expert. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531. 
II THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING THE DRUG 
AND WEAPON EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 404(b) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
"It is of course fundamental in our law that a person can be convicted only for acts 
committed, and not because of general character or a proclivity to commit bad acts." 
State v. Reed. 2000 UT 68,1(23, 8 P.3d 1025 (citation omitted). "Rule 404(b) governs 
the admissibility of bad acts evidence." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,^17. 6 
P.3dll20. It says: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
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other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). "In determining whether evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad 
acts is admissible, the trial court must initially decide whether the evidence is offered for 
a proper, noncharacter purpose rather than only to show the defendant's propensity to 
commit the crime charged." Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 at [^26 (citations omitted). "If the 
evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, then the court must determine 
whether the proffered evidence is relevant under Utah Rule of Evidence 402." IcL_ 
(citation omitted). "Finally, the trial court must determine whether the proffered 
evidence is admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 403." IJL (citation omitted). 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the gun and weapon 
evidence because: (A) it was not offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, (B) it was 
not relevant under rule 402, and (C) it did not meet the requirements of rule 403. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was 
prejudicial. See supra Part II.D. 
A± The Gun and Weapon Evidence Was Not Offered For a Proper, 
Noncharacter Purpose. 
"Under rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts must be 
adduced for a proper, noncharacter purpose to be admissible." Fedorowicz , 2002 UT 67 
at j^27 (citations omitted). "In other words, 'to be admissible, [the] evidence must have 
probative value other than to show an evil propensity or criminal temperament.5" Id. 
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(citation omitted). For example, in State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
the defendant was accused of hiring men to kill his wife. Id. at f3. The trial court 
admitted evidence that the defendant used stolen credit cards to purchase items in order 
to account for the money he was paying the men. IcL at ^13. Our supreme court held the 
evidence was admissible because it "directly linked" the defendant to the conspiracy and 
demonstrated preparation, plan, intent, and knowledge by showing how the defendant 
"disguise[d] his payments." Id atffi[19n. 4, 20. 
Evidence of drug dealing, like all bad acts evidence, must be presented for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose. See State v. O'Neil 848 P.2d 694, 700-01 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (holding evidence of distribution conviction was probative of knowledge and 
intent because defendant charged with distribution but claimed he "knew nothing" about 
the drugs); State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding evidence of 
marijuana distribution conviction probative of constructive possession because defendant 
charged with marijuana distribution but was not record owner of cabin or present when 
marijuana discovered). This is especially true in cases where the defendant is not 
charged with distribution. For example, in State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073, 
the defendant was charged with murder. Id. at ^[1. The trial court admitted evidence of 
the victim's "drug debt to" the defendant. IcL at [^56. On appeal, our supreme court held 
the evidence was properly presented to show motive and intent because the "only 
question for the jury" was whether the defendant killed the victim intentionally or while 
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"acting 'under an extreme emotional disturbance5 caused by his drug use." IdL. at ^ [57. 
Here, the gun and weapon evidence was not offered for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose. At trial, there was no question that Todd was murdered or that Todd's murder 
was motivated by drugs. R. 259:488-89. The shooter's motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident were clear—Todd 
would not return the drugs so the shooter shot Todd to retrieve the drugs. Id_ at 500-24. 
The only question for the jury was the identity of the shooter. Id. at 488-89, 500-24. The 
State offered the drug and weapon evidence for the purpose of proving Torres-Garcia 
was "a drug dealer." R. 254:27. Torres-Garcia's status as a drug dealer, however, did 
not help the jury identify him as the shooter. It did not place Torres-Garcia at the scene 
of the crime because it did not contain the drugs or weapon involved in the crime. IcL at 
8-15, 21-22; see Allen 2005 UT 11 at ffi[19 n. 4, 20 (holding evidence was presented for 
noncharacter purpose because it "directly linked" defendant to conspiracy). It did not 
demonstrate a particular pattern of behavior that tended to link Torres-Garcia to the 
crime. See Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 at ff24-25, 29 (holding testimony describing 
videotape of defendant "engaged in consensual sexual activities involving the whips and 
straps allegedly used to inflict [child's] injuries" was presented for noncharacter purpose 
because established "'pattern of behavior'"); State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57,^27, 993 P.2d 
837 (holding evidence of prior crimes was probative of identity because "numerous 
similarities" suggested "same person committed both crimes"). And it did not distinguish 
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Torres-Garcia from other possible shooters as the likely perpetrator. See. State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58,ffi[60-62, 27 P.3d 1115 (holding defendant's prior statements that "he would 
be better off killing his wife than divorcing her," his wife "was going to have an 
"accident/" and he wanted to hire someone "to kill his wife" were probative of 
defendant's "motive, plan, and intent to kill [his wife]"). Instead, it singled out Torres-
Garcia as a bad character who dealt drugs and shot anyone who interfered with his drug 
business, thereby increasing the likelihood of his guilt in this case. See State v. Webster, 
2001 UT App 238,1flf35-37, 32 P.3d 976 (holding, in case where defendant charged with 
stealing car from dealership, that testimony about prior arrest for stealing car from 
dealership was not probative of noncharacter purpose because record did not show 
"signature-like similarities" or "sufficient details" to justify conclusion that defendant 
was acting "pursuant to a common scheme or plan"). 
B. The Gun and Weapon Evidence Was Not Relevant As Required by Rule 402. 
"Bad acts evidence, like all evidence, must be relevant or it is inadmissible." 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at %L6 (citing Utah R. Evid. 402). "[Evidence is 
relevant if it has 'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence.5" Fedorowicz. 2002 UT 67 at [^32 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 401). "Further, 
even if otherwise relevant as defined by rule 401, evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible 
under rule 402 if the evidence is material and relevant to prove only the defendant's 
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proclivity to commit the crime charged." IcL (citation omitted); see State v. Forsvth. 641 
P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah 1982) (indicating evidence is not admitted merely because it 
shows plan, scheme, manner of operation, or the like but that evidence of noncharacter 
purpose is admissible where it tends to prove some fact material to the crime charged). 
In this case, the drug and weapon evidence should have been excluded because it 
was not relevant except to prove Torres-Garcia's proclivity to commit the crime charged. 
As explained above, the only issue at trial was identity. See. supra Part II.A. Thus, the 
drug and weapon evidence would only have been relevant if it increased the probability 
that Torres-Garcia was the shooter. See. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at [^28 (holding evidence 
of prior crimes highly probative of material fact—identity—because "numerous 
similarities" suggested "same person committed both crimes"). The drug and weapon 
evidence, however, could not increase the probability of Torres-Garcia's guilt because it 
did not contain the drugs or weapon involved in the crime and it did not demonstrate a 
pattern of behavior that linked Torres-Garcia to the crime. R. 254:8-15, 21-22. Instead, 
the drug and weapon evidence simply increased the probability that Torres-Garcia was a 
drug dealer who hoarded weapons. R. 254:27. This allowed the State to argue and the 
jury to infer that Torres-Garcia was the shooter because he was a violent drug dealer who 
often committed crimes like the crime charged. R. 259:487, 527-28, 538. 
C The Gun and Weapon Evidence Did Not Meet the Requirements of Rule 403. 
"Under rule 403, evidence can be excluded, even if relevant,' if its probative value 
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is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.'" Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 
at TJ36 (citation omitted). When deciding "whether to exclude otherwise admissible 
evidence under rule 403/' a trial court must consider several factors, including: 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to 
which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Allen, 2005 UT 11 at 1J24 (citations omitted); see State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 
(Utah 1988). 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by holding the other crime 
evidence was admissible under rule 403. First, the strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime was weak. At the time of trial, Torres-Garcia had not 
been convicted of possessing the drug and weapon evidence and, in fact, had a strong 
defense that the prosecutor could not prove constructive possession. R. 254:8-15. 
Second, the charged crime and the other crime were not similar. For this factor to 
be met, the charged crime and the other crime evidence must share "significant and 
striking similarities." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at ^29; see Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 
67 at [^37 (holding factor met because other crimes evidence "unmistakably similar" to 
allegations); Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^31 (holding factor met because "signature-like 
crimes"); State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,^j31, 57 P.3d 1139 (same). In this case, the 
charged crime and the other crime evidence were not similar. The charged crime was 
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murder. R. 4-5. It was a crime of violence that involved entering a person's hotel room 
and shooting the person in the head. Id. Conversely, the other crime evidence involved 
possession or distribution. R. 254:6-7. It was a nonviolent crime that occurred over a 
month after the charged incident and involved Torres-Garcia being arrested in an 
apartment where drugs and weapons were found. Id. 
Third, the State's need for the other crime evidence was low and the efficacy of 
alternative proof was high. In Decorso, our supreme court held the need for the other 
crime evidence was f,very high" and the "efficacy of alternative proof was very low'1 
because defendant murdered the only witness and the only other evidence was a 
fingerprint. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^33. "In short, the other crimes evidence . . . was 
vital to the State's case." Id. Conversely, in this case, the State's need for the other 
crime evidence was low and the efficacy of alternative proof was high. At trial, the only 
question was identity. See supra Part ILA. To prove Torres-Garcia was the shooter, the 
State had Irwin's eyewitness testimony and Delgado-Cruz's corroborating testimony. K. 
256; 258. If the jury believed Irwin's and/or Delgado-Cruz's testimony, then it had 
sufficient evidence to convict. Id. Thus, the State had no need for the drug and weapon 
evidence, especially since it did not help establish identity. See supra Part ILA. 
Fourth, and most important, the evidence would rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility. To avoid rousing the jury to overmastering hostility, trial courts should not 
admit evidence that suggests a greater "proclivity for violence" or a more "'significant 
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criminal character"1 than the charged crime. Bisner, 2001 UT 99 at f 59 (citation 
omitted): see State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,^ j52, 28 P.3d 1278 (holding other crimes 
evidence would not rouse jury to overmastering hostility because "was no worse than the 
evidence already before the jury"); Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^34 (holding other crimes 
evidence would not rouse jury to overmastering hostility because crimes "were minor 
when compared to the aggravated murder charge in this case" since defendant "did not 
harm or injure his victim"). In this case, the other crime evidence suggested a much 
greater proclivity for violence and a much more significant criminal character than the 
charged crime. Torres-Garcia was charged with shooting one man over a drug dispute. 
R. 4-5. Conversely, the State presented the drug and weapon evidence to show Torres-
Garcia was a drug dealer with a large cache of weapons that he kept for the very purpose 
of killing anyone that interfered with his business. R. 259:487, 527-28, 538. Although 
the drug and weapon evidence did not help the jury establish Torres-Garcia's guilt in this 
case, it helped the jury infer Torres-Garcia's guilt in countless similar cases. See supra 
Part II.A. Thus, the drug and weapon evidence roused the jury to overmastering hostility 
by allowing it to conclude Torres-Garcia, even if he did not shoot Todd, was deserving 
of prison because he hoarded weapons and used these weapons to kill anyone who 
interfered with his drug business. R. 259:487, 527-28, 538. 
D. The Admission of the Gun and Weapon Evidence Was Prejudicial Error. 
An error is prejudicial if "the likelihood of a different outcome [in the absence of 
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the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. 
Adams, 2000 UT 42,f20, 5 P.3d 642 (alterations in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted); see State v. Houskeeper. 2002 UT 118,126, 62 P.3d 444 (holding "an appellate 
court will not overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper evidence if the 
admission of the evidence did not reasonably effect the likelihood of a different verdict"). 
In this case, Torres-Garcia was prejudiced by the trial court's erroneous admission 
of the drug and weapon evidence. Had the jury not had the drug and weapon evidence to 
bolster the State's case, there is a substantial likelihood that it would have acquitted. As 
explained above, the only issue at trial was identification. See. supra Part II.A. To 
establish identification, the State presented Irwin's eyewitness testimony and Delgado-
Cruz's corroborating testimony. R. 256; 258. Both Irwin's eyewitness testimony and 
Delgado-Cruz's corroborating testimony, however, were questionable. 
Although Irwin identified Torres-Garcia as the shooter, the circumstances 
surrounding her identification were so questionable that its admissibility was questioned 
below. R. 256:26-27; see State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986) (noting 
"accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence with which 
it is made." (citation omitted)). First, Irwin witnessed the shooting after at least two days 
of ingesting drugs and foregoing sleep. R. 256:26-27; 196-97, 213; see Long, 721 P.2d 
at 488 (holding eyewitness' "physical condition, including . . . fatigue and drug or 
alcohol use" affects perception even more than "circumstances of the observation"). In 
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fact, during her interview with Detective Prior on the night of the incident, the influence 
of the drugs in her system caused her to repeatedly "nod off1 and have "a difficult time 
telling him what happened." R. 256:196-97. Second, Irwin's attention was likely drawn 
from the shooter's face because the incident involved guns and a violent attack on her 
husband. IcL at 168-71; see Long, 721 P.2d at 489 (noting "perceptual abilities are 
known to decrease significantly" when observer "is experiencing a marked degree of 
stress"). This accounts for Irwin's testimony that she saw two people holding guns, but 
that she "|j]ust heard a gunshot" and did not actually see who pulled the trigger. R. 
256:170, 198, 203-04; 258:353. Third, her description of the incident and the shooter 
changed significantly overtime. R. 256:194-95, 198, 206-10; 258:254-55, 304, 323-26, 
330-31; see Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (explaining eyewitnesses "tend to add extraneous 
details and to fill in memory gaps over time, thereby unconsciously constructing more 
detailed, logical, and coherent recollections of their actual experiences"). Most 
significantly, she completely failed to identify Fernando as the shooter until his name was 
suggested to her, even though she had talked about Fernando and had claimed she knew 
Fernando by name and face. R. 256:172, 209; 258:312-13, 319-20, 328-29, 332, 375; 
see Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (explaining interviewing officers "by using a variety of subtle 
and perhaps unconscious questioning techniques, can significantly influence what a 
witness 'remembers' in response to questioning"). Fourth, before Officer Prior asked 
Irwin to attempt to identify the shooter in a photo array, he told her he had "reason to 
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believe that one of the people pictured in this group of photographs may in fact be one of 
the people associated with this incident/1 R. 258:376; see. Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (noting 
"suggestiveness of police lineups, showups, and photo array"). Moreover, Irwin's 
personal credibility was questionable. She had recently engaged in a sexual relationship 
with Delgado-Cruz, another potential shooter. R. 256:178-81. She also admitted she had 
twice pleaded guilty to providing false information to a police officer. IcL at 177. 
Similarly, although Delgado-Cruz corroborated Irwin's testimony, Delgado-
Cruz's testimony was questionable. First, Delgado-Cruz admitted he was employed as a 
drug runner and had been arrested for selling drugs. R. 258:289, 398. He also admitted 
that he was hoping to get a better deal in exchange for testifying in Torres-Garcia's case. 
Id at 410, 420; see Bisner, 2001 UT 99 at ^ 3 2 , 40 (noting evidence that witness is 
cooperating with State is potentially "exculpatory evidence"). Second, like Irwin, he 
testified that two people had a gun and that he did not actually see who shot Todd. R. 
258:382, 405, 418. Third, he admitted that he had multiple motives for shooting Todd. 
R. 258:411-14. Not only was he the person who was entrusted to deliver the heroin and 
who abandoned the heroin to Todd, he was also the person who was engaged in sexual 
relations with Irwin and whom Todd did not like. IjL. 
Thus, the evidence identifying Torres-Garcia as the shooter was questionable and, 
absent the bolstering effect of the drug and weapon evidence, there was a reasonable 
likelihood that it would have been rejected by the jury. The prejudicial effect of the drug 
44 
and weapon evidence was significantly increased by the way the State presented the drug 
and weapon evidence to the jury. First, the State called Detective Prior to detail the 
amounts and types of drugs, weapons and other paraphernalia included in the drug and 
weapon evidence and, during Detective Prior's presentation, displayed the actual drugs 
and bag of weapons to the jury. R. 258:293-99. This allowed the jury to infer from the 
sheer volume of the evidence that Torres-Garcia ran a large drug business and had many 
guns to kill many people in the protection of that business. IJL Second, the State called 
Watson to testify that, in his expert opinion, the drug and weapon evidence indicated 
Torres-Garcia was a significant drug dealer. IcL. at 434-36. This expert conclusion 
emphasized and gave heightened authority to the State's characterization of Torres-
Garcia as a violent and dangerous drug dealer. IdL Moreover, Torres-Garcia was forced 
to let Watson's testimony stand virtually uncross-examined because he did not receive 
notice of Watson's testimony. IdL at 442; see supra Part I. Thus, the authoritativeness of 
Watson's testimony multiplied because, in the eyes of the jury, Watson's testimony was 
so accurate that the defense could not cross-examine it. Id. 
Accordingly, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have acquitted 
Torres-Garcia absent the drug and weapon evidence. In fact, before reaching its verdict, 
the jury deliberated for over thirteen hours, sent two questions to the judge, and told the 
bailiff they had nearly reached an "impasse." R. 158-59; 260:3-7, 18-19. In the end, the 
jury acquitted Babluene-Para, who was not characterized as a drug dealer, and convicted 
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Torres-Garcia, who was characterized as a drug dealer. R. 260:19-21. This suggests the 
jury had a very difficult time reaching a verdict and, absent the drug and weapon 
evidence, likely would not have found enough evidence to convict Torres-Garcia. IcL_ 
Moreover, the trial court's jury instruction did not cure the prejudicial effect of the 
drug and weapon evidence. The trial court instructed the jury that ,f[p]roof that the 
defendant has engaged in a drug business may not be used to show that the defendant is 
not a truthful person or that he is a murderer." R. 194. This instruction did nothing to 
mitigate the prejudicial effects of the State's use of the drug and weapon evidence. Id. 
The State did not admit the drug and weapon evidence simply to show Torres-Garcia had 
a drug business. The State, as explained in its closing argument, admitted the drug and 
weapon evidence to show Torres-Garcia was a significant drug dealer who possessed 
numerous guns and used these guns to kill people who "mess[ed],f with his business. R. 
259:487, 527-28, 538. Thus, simply instructing the jury that the fact that Torres-Garcia 
had a drug business did not mean he was a murderer did not cure the prejudicial effect of 
admitting the drug and weapon evidence to show Torres-Garcia was a significant drug 
dealer who kept a cache of weapons specifically for the purpose of killing people who 
interfered with his drug business. R. 194. 
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Ill THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE 
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS 
UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE THAT TORRES-GARCIA HAD A 
FAIR TRIAL 
"Under the cumulative error doctrine," this Court will reverse "if 'the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. 
Kohl 2000 UT 35,^ 125, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted); see. State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 
367-368 (Utah 1993) ("The doctrine of cumulative error allows for a new trial when 
standing alone, no error is severe enough to warrant a new trial, but when considered 
together, the errors denied the defendant a fair trial."). In assessing a cumulative error 
claim, this Court will "consider all the identified errors, as well as any other errors [it] 
assume[s] may have occurred." Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at f25. 
In this case, this Court should reverse because the cumulative effect of the trial 
court's errors undermines confidence that Torres-Garcia had a fair trial. The trial court 
erred by allowing Watson to give expert testimony without granting Torres-Garcia a 
continuance, even though the State did not provide the required notice of expert 
testimony. See supra Part I. The trial court also erred by admitting the drug and weapon 
evidence even though it was inadmissible character evidence under rule 404(b). See 
supra Part II. Individually, these errors prejudiced Torres-Garcia. See supra Parts I, II. 
First, denying Torres-Garcia a continuance prejudiced his case because it forced him to 
defend himself without adequately preparing to meet Watson's testimony. See. supra Part 
I. It also hindered his motion practice because he was not sure what the State's case 
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would or would not entail. R. 256:25-27, 34. Second, admitting the drug and weapon 
evidence prejudiced Torres-Garcia by characterizing him as a violent and dangerous drug 
dealer who kept a cache of weapons for the purpose of killing anyone who interfered 
with his drug business. See supra Part II. 
Cumulatively, these errors denied Torres-Garcia a fair trial because they 
completely undermined his defense. Torres-Garcia filed discovery requests for each of 
the State's witnesses and particularly for the witnesses who would testify about the drug 
and weapon evidence. R. 15-17. Based on the discovery he received, Torres-Garcia 
fully prepared for trial. See supra Part LB. He developed a defense that focused on the 
discrepancies in Irwin's testimony and planned his trial strategy around that defense. R. 
256:147-50. On the first day of trial, however, Torres-Garcia learned the State would be 
permitted to call Watson to give expert testimony about drug trafficking even though it 
had not provided proper notice. R. 256:14-16. Because he was denied a continuance to 
prepare to meet Watson's testimony, Torres-Garcia proceeded to trial as best he 
could—using his original defense plan. R. 256; 258. In the end, however, the cumulative 
errors of denying Torres-Garcia a continuance and admitting the drug and weapon 
evidence undermined Torres-Garcia's defense strategy and prejudiced his case. Id. 
Watson's testimony directly challenged Torres-Garcia's defense because it 
explained away the discrepancies in Irwin's testimony that Torres-Garcia had 
emphasized during his opening statement, highlighted during cross-examination, and 
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recorded on his chart of important discrepancies to remember. R. 256; 258; 258:437-38. 
Watson's testimony also gave heightened authority to the drug and weapon evidence 
because Watson testified that in his expert opinion the drug and weapon evidence 
indicated Torres-Garcia was a significant drug dealer. R. 258:434-36. This conclusion 
gave expert endorsement to the State's characterization of Torres-Garcia during trial and 
during closing arguments as a dangerous drug dealer who harbored weapons for the 
purpose of killing people who interfered in his drug business. R. 258:434-36; 259:487, 
527-28, 538. This is especially true because Watson was in the courtroom throughout 
trial, where the jury could see him acting as an expert and interacting with or even 
advising the prosecutor. R. 256:34. Because the State did not give Torres-Garcia notice 
of Watson's testimony and the trial court denied Torres-Garcia a continuance, however, 
Torres-Garcia was forced to leave Watson's testimony virtually uncross-examined. R. 
258:442; see supra Part I. Thus, the credibility of Torres-Garcia's defense was 
significantly diminished because he could not counter Watson's expert testimony that 
Irwin's discrepancies were inconsequential. Conversely, the State's improper 
characterization of Torres-Garcia as a dangerous drug dealer who killed people that 
interfered with his drug business was significantly bolstered because Torres-Garcia could 
not counter Watson's expert testimony that the drug and weapon evidence indicated 
Torres-Garcia was a notable drug dealer. R. 258:442. Thus, this Court should reverse 
because the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors denied Torres-Garcia a fair trial. 
49 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Torres-Garcia's conviction because the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying Torres-Garcia's motion for a continuance and by 
admitting the drug and weapon evidence. 
SUBMITTED this as**- day of March, 2005. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 
aft* day of March, 2005. 
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Addendum B 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-17-13, Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony suffi-
cient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult 
with the opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee 
charged by the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the 
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the 
witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the 
information concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving 
notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party 
anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the information 
required under Subsection (l)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with 
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to 
prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's 
testimony will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately 
violated the provisions of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of 
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by 
the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary 
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's 
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at 
which the expert may be called as an expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of 
the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on 
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as 
a witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult 
with the opposing party upon reasonable notice. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait 
of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and 
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the 
accused offered by the prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution 
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crim.es, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance 
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 2001.) 
Addendum C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KATHERINE BERNARDS-GOODMAN, 5446 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 




IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
^ 
o 





NOTICE OF EXPERT WITNESS 
Case No. 031907945FS 
Judge ANN BOYDEN 
The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, David E. Yocom and Katherine Bernards-
Goodman, hereby provides notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13 (1953 as amended), of 
the State's intent to introduce expert opinion testimony through Dr. Todd Grey, a Chief Medical 
Examiner for the Office of the Medical Examiner and Craig Watson, Assistant Chief Investigator 
for the District Attorney's Office. Dr. Grey, whose curriculum vitae are attached, will be called 
to testify concerning the autopsy of the victim. Mr. Watson, whose curriculum vitae are 
attached, will be called to testify concerning drug trafficking. 
DATED this | ^ day of April, 2004. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SERINE BERNARDS-GOODMAN 
Deputy District Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the of April, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Expert Witness to be mailed to D. Richard Smith, Attorney for 
Defendant, at 4444 South 700 East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107. 
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OopitfyCteffc 
substantially outweigh the probative effect; certainly outweigh 
the prejudicial effect under Rule 609. 
So, if this defendant does testify — and clearly 
that's the underlying basis — then prior convictions are 
admissible by my ruling today. 
Secondly, we need to address the defendant's motion 
to — regarding the seizure of weapons at the time of the 
defendant's arrest. The defendant has argued that this should 
be kept out under Rules of Evidence 404(b). The State has 
argued two alternative theories, which I think both kind of 
intertwine, just as the facts intertwine in this case. 
First of all, the State argues that, really, 404(b) 
does not apply, because this is an ongoing criminal episode. 
I have listened to that argument and find that the 
underlying factors that they argue, why this is a single 
criminal episode, and that the court can decide that it's a 
single criminal episode — even though they have not been 
charged together — that the State has chosen not to charge 
these together, for various reasons. 
And I'm sure part of those reasons are the very 
reasons that I do not find that it should come in, in spite of 
404(b), because it is ongoing criminal episode. While those 
factors are there, I do not find that Rule 404(b) does not 
apply. 
I think it does apply here, and therefore, turning to 
1 the alternative theory that the State has argued this under, 
2 that 404(b) does apply, and whether or not the evidence of the 
3 guns and weapons should be admitted under the 404(b) analysis 
4 of the rule, I do find that the evidence of the guns and the 
5 evidence of the drugs, while they are not the specific guns or 
6 specific drugs that are shown to be involved in the murder case 
7 itself, certainly are highly relevant and highly probative of 
8 the State's case. 
9 The evidence that the defendant was found in the 
10 possession of guns, of weapons, and drugs, within weeks after 
11 this murder occurred, is highly probative of non-character 
12 purposes; specifically, it shows directly the plan or the modis 
13 operandi as it is referred to in the State's brief. Rule 404 
14 does not actually use the word "scheme" or "specific modis 
15 operandi," but it does — the case law does say that that 
16 refers to plan and rule. 404(b) does use the language "prepare 
17 and plan. " 
18 And I find that the evidence of weapons and drugs 
19 found on the defendant shortly after this murder does go 
20 directly to the State's theory of the plan that was made by the 
21 defendant, in that this murder was based on a drug deal that 
22 went very, very bad. 
23 And so, evidence of the drugs and weapons is directly 
24 probative of the defendant's intent, preparation, plan, lack of 
25 mistake, or accident in this case. 
1 I also find that that evidence goes directly to the 
2 non-character purpose of proving identity under Rule 404(b). 
3 The State witness who is the widow of the deceased in 
4 this case, identified at preliminary hearing — she identified 
5 earlier, but at preliminary hearing — testified that she 
6 identified her husband's killer as a drug dealer who had — who 
7 they had asked for drugs from, and drugs had been delivered. 
8 So, clearly, the evidence of the drugs and the guns directly 
9 goes to the witness's testimony as to I.D.fing the defendant in 
10 the murder case. And so, it is admissible under those 
11 appropriate, non-character purposes. 
12 In weighing, which this court must also do, whether 
13 or not those appropriate purposes are outweighed again by the 
14 highly prejudicial nature, I consider all of the arguments that 
15 have been made by both the defendant and the State as well. 
16 Again, because this evidence is going to come in, 
17 appropriately through the Statefs witnesses, it affects the 
18 prejudicial nature of the evidence coming in through the 404(b) 
19 evidence, in that what the jury or trier of fact are going to 
20 be hearing is this evidence. 
21 Otherwise, the fact that it is so supportive of the 
22 identity and the plan, it is directly probative, directly 
23 relevant, and I do not find that it is so prejudicial that it 
24 outweighs that probativeness or that it rises or would have the 
25 potential for raising doubts in the jury or to create 
1 hostility. It just simply is not that type of evidence, that 
2 type of prejudicial evidence, 
3 The fact that this is two separate type of charges, 
4 drug charges, as opposed to murder charges, I have considered, 
5 because I do think it is important that we do not view this 
6 testimony or this evidence in any way to show that because the 
7 defendant is a drug dealer, by the testimony that comes in, he 
8 is therefore a liar or a murderer; that the evidence of drug 
9 offenses does not show that someone is not truthful in the 
10 testimony. 
11 The veracity — unless it is shown specifically in 
12 the statement that the defendant made, or specifically in the 
13 statement of the defendant, the facts surroundings the drug 
14 dealing; drug dealing itself has not been determined in 
15 precedent case law to be an indicator of veracity. 
16 So, when defense counsel argued the statement on Page 
17 14, that two prior drug offenses illustrate he is not a truthful 
18 person, I agree with the defense there that that is not an 
19 indicator as to his veracity. The veracity can only be shown 
20 by the very specifics of the statements he made and the facts 
21 of the underlying drug offenses. 
22 So, if it is being used to show veracity, there needs 
23 J to be very specific statements and factual bases for why that 
24 goes to the truthfulness, rather than simply that there are 
25 drug offenses involved. Drug offenses do not address veracity. 
1 As, too, the admitting this for the purpose that 
2 because he is a drug dealer he is therefore a murderer, that is 
3 absolutely inappropriate and will not be allowed in court. The 
4 court is not allowing evidence of the drug, or weapons, or 
5 prior convictions for 404 purposes, to show that he is of bad 
6 character or that he is a drug dealer, or to show that he is a 
7 murderer. 
8 Again, it is only being admitted for the purposes of 
9 showing preparation, plan, intent, identity, absence of 
10 mistake, or accident; all of the purposes that are appropriate 
11 under 404(b) as non-character purposes. 
12 And certainly it may not be argued in any way that 
13 because of the prior convictions or the drug possessions or 
14 weapons possessions that he is therefore of a character to 
15 commit a murder or drug offenses. 
16 All of it is to go specifically to the non-character 
17 purposes that I have addressed. 
18 Therefore, I would ask that, based on this ruling 
19 today, that the State prepare a jury instruction that clarifies 
20 to the trier of fact the purposes for — that this type of 
21 evidence is being admitted for; and specifically that they may 
22 not consider it for character purposes; that it is only being 
23 allowed to show the non-character purposes that are allowed by 
24 Rule 404(b), and that I have addresses in my ruling today. 
25 Is there any question about my ruling, any 
1 clarifications? 
2 MR. FUELLING: Just a little bit, Judge. The court 
3 mentioned the evidence would go to show I.D. Now, it's 
4 different guns, and it hasn't been proven that it's the same 
5 drugs. 
6 So, I guess I'm asking for some clarification as to 
7 how the different drugs and different guns would show I.D. 
8 specifically. 
9 I have a second question. If I heard the court 
10 correctly, at the end, the testimony would come in — I mean, 
11 the officer that made the arrest is going to be called 
12 separately by the State. When he was arrested, there was a bag 
13 of guns and drugs, though not specifically linked to this case. 
14 If this is all he says — and it's my understanding 
15 that's all he can say, because if he alludes at all to the fact 
16 that, therefore, the defendant is a drug dealer, that's an 
17 argument he can't make, or the State can't make. 
18 In other words, the court has allowed the evidence to 
19 J come in, but the State is prohibited at this point from saying 
20 that he's a drug dealer based on that evidence. 
21 And I guess that conflicts somewhat in my mind. If 
22 that comes in under the State's idea that this comes in to show 
23 this ongoing drug-dealing operation, then they bring that 
24 evidence in, and by virtue of the fact that the drugs and guns 
25 come in, and the State, on a separate occasion, argues he's a 
1 I drug dealer, that nexus is there, and I'm not understanding how 
2 that will be separated pursuant to the court's ruling. Does 
3 that make sense? 
4 THE COURT: I'll ask Ms. Bernards-Goodman to respond 
5 as well. But is that a correct proffer of what the Statef s 
6 witnesses are going to testify to? Under 404(b), not under 
7 Rule 609, how much evidence is the State planning on putting on 
8 in their case in chief? 
9 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: The State does intend to call 
10 the detective who found the defendant with the guns and drugs, 
11 and the they are not the same guns and drugs. That would be 
12 the extent of his testimony. 
13 The State does have an expert witness, Craig Watson, 
14 who is an expert in distribution. The State intends to show 
15 that not only are these drugs, but that these <ire drugs in 
16 amounts of distribution. As I?ve argued before, that's the 
17 whole underlying story of this case: The defendant was in 
18 possession of a drug business. 
19 And while this doesn't say he necessarily is a 
20 murderer — and there will be the jury instruction as to 
21 that — the State does intend to prove that the defendant is a 
22 I drug dealer. 
23 MR. FUELLING: And therein lies the conflict. I 
24 mean, the court has made a ruling that this comes in not to 
25 prove he's a drug dealer and the State's going to bring an 
expert in for the specific purpose of saying he's a drug 
dealer. 
And so I think that conflict has to be overcome, and 
I think that is what conflicts with the 404(b) that the court 
has talked about. 
THE COURT: I can clarify. My ruling is that this 
evidence comes in, and that it is not being admitted for the 
purposes of character testimony to say that a drug dealer is a 
murderer. But it is coming in under a murder case. 
And, so, the State, by my ruling — I am allowing it 
in for non-character purposes — is allowing that it may come 
in through the officer, through cross-examination. 
It will be clearly shown to the jury that this is not 
the same drugs, but sounds as though the jury or the State is 
to bring in also an expert witness to show that the amount and 
types of drugs that were found on the defendant are consistent 
with drug dealing, which is absolutely probative on the State's 
theory in this case, and is being allowed to show preparation, 
plan, intent, identity, absence of mistake, or accident. 
And so if that testimony comes in to show all of 
those indications — and it sounds like, from what's being 
proffered by the State, that it will do that — my ruling 
allows that. 
The jury instruction that Ifm asking be prepared, and 
the only instruction that will be given to the jury by this 
1 court, is that they are not to use that testimony for character 
2 purposes; but, certainly, if that goes to preparation, plan, 
3 intent, which is the underlying drug dealing, then it is 
4 allowed there. 
5 1 So, I don't know how much clearer I can make that, 
6 Mr. Fuelling. I'm allowing it in. I'm allowing it in for 
7 non-character purposes. And the identity was clearly to — 
8 even though they are not the same weapons and not the same 
9 drugs — the identification made by the defendant, excuse me, 
10 by the deceased's wife, as the person who came in to the hotel 
11 room and shot her husband was the drug dealer. And so that 
12 comes in as well. 
13 MR. FUELLING: But that was not the case. I mean, in 
14 other words the State's witness is the one who brought drugs in 
15 to the home and dealt the drugs. There's a nexus in my client 
16 in that she says that she thinks he's the one who she called, 
17 even though she called him by a different name. 
18 So, the I.D. that he dealt the drugs is incorrect in 
19 the State's own case. In other words, they can't I.D. the 
20 exact gun; they can't I.D. the exact person; they can't I.D. 
21 that he was the person who brought the drugs in because it's 
22 clearly a different person. 
23 I As to preparation and plan, there's no nexus that 
24 this drug dealer is the one who dealt the drugs to that place 
25 on the same day. Otherwise, we're doing a drug-dealing case. 
1 And I guess that's the problem. By virtue of the 
2 officer and the expert, character is exactly what is being 
3 argued. It's that, "here's the drug dealer, and this is how 
4 we're going to show he's the drug dealer," and so character is 
5 implicit in that. 
6 And therein lies the argument, Judge. If it's a 
7 matter of the officer taking the stand and saying, "okay, look, 
8 when he was arrested, there were guns — 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Fuelling, I understand your argument, 
10 and you've argued, again, the theory of the case. 
11 Ms. Bernards-Goodman, is there anything specific on that? 
12 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: Well, I think he's forgetting 
13 about the immediate witness. Maybe Clara doesn't say, "I know 
14 the drugs come from him." We have Clara saying, "I know the 
15 drugs come from Carlos." Then we have Carlos saying, "I get my 
16 drugs from him." There's the connection. 
17 THE COURT: I have ruled on this. Because I was the 
18 preliminary hearing judge, which is unusual in certain 
19 circumstances, but I was in this case, and heard it, I do have 
20 that preliminary information of the testimony. 
21 But most importantly my ruling here is that all of 
22 that evidence comes in for non-character purposes, and what 
23 Mr. Fuelling is arguing is certainly the defendant's theory and 
24 defense, and will be argued fully and completely, I'm 
25 confident, at trial. 
1 But the evidence as I have ruled in my ruling today, 
2 regarding the seizure of weapons and drugs at the time of the 
3 defendant's arrest, is directly enough connected to this case 
4 for proper, non-character purposes that they are admitted. And 
5 I do want a jury instruction to go that, that it is for 
6 non-character purposes. 
7 MR. FUELLING: Judge, we will file a motion to 
8 reconsider and file a motion or order showing how the court has 
9 ruled, because I think we'll need as clear a record as possible 
10 I for any appeal issues. 
11 THE COURT: I think what we need right now, then, is 
12 the State to prepare findings as quickly as possible, since 
13 this is set for jury next week, and so that the defense has 
14 J those findings; or at least draft copies. 
15 But I will be able to review those copies, those 
16 findings, as soon as they are in. 
17 MR. FUELLING: If we could get that, I do think that 
18 we will file a motion to reconsider based on the findings, but 
19 I I think it's appropriate that we have those before we proceed, 
20 and we'd like as clear a record as possible before that 
21 evidence comes in, because I think there probably an appeal 
22 issue based on that. 
23 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: I have drug court all day but 
24 I'll do it. 
25 THE COURT: All right. I appreciate it. Anything 
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The State, by and through, Katherine Bernards-Goodman, Deputy District Attorney, 
herein submits the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about September 23, 2003, John Todd Irwin and his wife, Clara Irwin were in their 
hotel room at 1865 West North Temple when they decided to call "Carlos'* to order some 
drugs for their personal use. 
2. Within a few minutes, Carlos Delgado-Cruz arrived with the drugs for Mr. and Mrs. 
Irwin. While delivering the hrwins their drugs, Delgado-Cruz noticed a Salt Lake City 
Police Officer pulling into the parking lot. As a result, Delgado-Cruz left approximately 
50 balloons containing drugs with Mr. and Mrs. Irwin and left the scene. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 011905278 
Page 2 
3. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Irwin called the dealer she knew supplied drugs for "Carlos" and 
told him about the drugs. Mr. Irwin got on the phone and told the dealer he wanted 
something for "holding the drugs". No agreement could be reached. 
4. Some time later that same evening multiple individuals entered the Irwin's hotel room, 
assaulted Mr. Irwin by striking him with a gun and then shot him in the head with the 
gun. 
5. On October 1,2003 Mr. Irwin died as a result of the gunshot wound. 
6. On November 5, 2003 Carlos Delgado-Cruz came forward and told Detective Prior that 
he was present when Mr. Irwin was shot and that he was the drug runner who delivered 
drugs to Clara and Todd Irvin. Delgado-Cruz identified Defendants Salvador Torres-
Garcia and Elizar Balbuena-Para as the individuals who entered the Irwin's hotel room 
and assaulted Mr. Irwin. 
7. On November 11, 2003 a search warrant was executed at 1107 West 3900 South #901, 
the address identified by Carlos Delgado-Cruz as belonging to Defendant Salvador 
Torres-Garcia. Mr. Torres-Garcia was located in the residence, along with drugs and 
guns. 
8. On November 13, 2003 Clara Irwin identified Defendant Salvador Torres-Garcia as the 
individual who shot her husband on September 23,2003 from a photo spread. She later 
identified Mr. Torres-Garcia at a line-up and again at preliminary hearing. 
9. Defendant Torres-Garcia now seeks through Motion in Limine to exclude the evidence of 
the drugs and guns located upon his arrest as well as evidence regarding his prior 
convictions. After review of the motions and hearing arguments, the court makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 011905278 
Page 3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant' s prior convictions qualify under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 for 
admission for impeachment purposes, if defendant chooses to take the stand. 
2. Defendant's prior convictions are felonies and occurred within the last 10 years. 
3. Defendant's prior convictions are for drug offenses. 
4. Defendant's prior convictions are extremely relevant to this case due to the fact 
that the case revolves around an alleged drug business conducted by Mr. Torres-
Garcia. 
5. Due to the fact that the jury will be hearing evidence regarding this drug business 
through the testimony of state's witnesses, Defendant's prior drug convictions 
will not be more prejudicial than probative. 
6. Evidence of the weapons and drugs found with the Defendant upon his arrest 
qualify for admissible evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
7. While the guns and drugs were not the same drugs or same gun involved in the 
homicide, they are probative fo: :he non-character purposes of proving identity, 
intent, plan, preparation and lack of accident. 
8. Specifically the drugs and guns show a plan, a modis operendi, or scheme 
engaged in by defendant to conduct and protect a drug business. 
9. The evidence will not be more prejudicial than probative due to the fact that the 
jury will already hear this evidence through the testimony of state's witnesses. 
10. Neither is this evidence of the sort that should raise the jury to overmastering 
hostility. 
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ORDER 
Defendant's prior convictions are admissible for impeachment purposes under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609. Evidence of drugs and guns found with the defendant upon 
his arrest are relevant to show a plan on the part of the defendant to conduct a drug 
business. The State is to prepare jury instructions regarding the evidence for the use of 
the jury. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: ft -f^* '''*' **> ^ 
ANN BOYDEN, Dfejrict Judge 
Approved as to form. 
- • V-. 
f.lS^g^ ;>t\ 
Brennan Feuling 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Facts, 
Conclusions Of Law was delivered to Brennan Fueling, LDA. 
On the day of. 
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haven't heard what that is. Otherwise, there's no basis for 
calling an expert. 
THE COURT: Any further response? 
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: I'd submit it. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I do agree with Mr. Mack's 
assessment that there is not bad faith in this. In fact, the 
State has in fact submitted notice of the expert testimony, it 
was done in a timely fashion, there were no specific reports to 
attach so that they could not comply with that and they have 
stated a statement of what Mr. Watson's testimony would be and 
that he would be called to testify concerning drug trafficking. 
Clearly, that is a general statement as to what it 
is. I think it is not unfair to say that it could be implied 
or understood by the defense with the information on the case 
what the theory is, and particularly with the responses in 
motions in limine that we have done already. But the issue I 
need to address is whether or not the defendant has had an 
opportunity to fully prepare for expert testimony given the 
information that the defense and the defense counsel 
particularly has received in this case. And I am inclined, in 
any case that carries with it the kind of penalty — this is a 
first degree felony, it is a homicide case, it is not something 
where the expert testimony is going to be particularly complex, 
but it does need to at least be sufficient as the rule requires 
for the opposing side to prepare against it. 
The statement that has been made is general and I can 
only rely on the response of the defense whether it's 
disingenuous or not. I'm.not too concerned, I have not 
received any indication that it is or that counsel has been 
disingenuous. 
I do know that we have had hearings and pretrials and 
addressed these issues and I think that the defense probably 
had a pretty good idea of what the State's theory is, and 
particularly with the motions in limine. But the motion in 
limine was last week, Thursday, and so it does not give 
sufficient time to prepare, I guess, a notice. If the defense 
is stating it on the record, I can only take in good faith 
their statements that they did not receive sufficient 
information as the rule requires to determine what this expert 
testimony is. 
The remedy is continuance or notice or time for 
preparation. Is it necessary to continue the case? I mean, 
you did get that indication on Thursday, there are not 
extensive reports. 
Mr. Mack, is it your statement to the court and your 
understanding that this really does mean more time to prepare? 
MR. MACK: Your Honor, I think that we would require 
additional time. Still we would like to see some sort of 
summary. I think that maybe once we see that then there would 
be the necessity of having a Rimmasch hearing or the 
1 opportunity at least to consult an expert of our own in some 
2 sort of rebuttal. But, you know, we still don't know any more 
3 than what has been read into the record, that he's going to 
4 talk about drug trafficking. I think it needs to be fuller 
5 than that and I think, yes, we do, I guess depending what he 
6 says, especially, require additional time to counter that. 
7 THE COURT: And I believe that the response of 
8 defense counsel at that time was what I needed to have on the 
9 record before ruling that in fact the whole underlying purpose 
10 behind this kind of notice in expert testimony is so that the 
11 opposing party can counter expert testimony, whether that's 
12 through testimony of their own witnesses of their own, or a 
13 scientific reliability argument. And without any of that being 
14 done within the time frame that's necessary, what I'm working 
15 in the back of my mind is that that information really was 
16 provided at the Thursday hearing and this testimony may not 
17 even be until Thursday of this week, but that undermines the 
18 purpose of the rule in notice and I need to rule that in fact 
19 the opposing party in this case has stated in good faith and I 
20 am satisfied that they would not be able to prepare to counter 
21 the expert testimony concerning drug trafficking. 
22 There has been no motion made as far as the expert 
23 testimony with the medical examiner in this motion; correct? 
24 Even though the underlying argument that you did not receive 
25 the notice of expert witness, does that argument also pertain 
to the expert testimony of Dr. Todd Grey? 
MR. MACK: No, because we have his resume on file, we 
have the autopsy report. And I think, although he wasn't 
called at the preliminary hearing, there was some discussion 
and waiver of his testimony at the preliminary hearing, which I 
think complies with -- there is other provisions in the notice 
statute that indicate that that satisfies compliance. 
THE COURT: I turn the ball back over, then, with 
that ruling that there does need to be more time for 
preparation to counter the expert testimony of Investigator 
Watson. Does the State wish to respond or to go forward 
without that expert testimony? The delay and need for 
continuance is only specifically to the testimony of the 
assistant chief investigator. 
Mr. Fuelling stated that regardless of my ruling on 
the 404(b) that the defense was ready to go forward, but that 
involved a different issue. And that may be part of why the 
State is proceeding in the way they are, because I made my 
ruling that I did on Thursday. 
Does the State wish to go forward with this trial 
without that expert testimony or do we need to continue this? 
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: I guess we need to continue. 
THE COURT: Certainly it is the burden on the State 
to proceed as they need to proceed and they have in fact filed 
the timeliness, it is just simply the issue of whether or not 
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1 didn't get it through their office, notice of our experts. And 
2 if they want to say acquired street knowledge is not expert 
3 knowledge, then I guess we can put the witness on and — notice 
4 other than our witness list. So I think the State has provided 
5 adequate knowledge. This is not of such a unique or scientific 
6 type that it would require months of preparation, and I think 
7 the State should be allowed to use their witness. 
8 MR. MACK: If I may reply briefly. 
9 The police reports, Judge, we have. We have the 
10 police reports. There is no report from Watson. So that's not 
11 really fair to say that that puts us on notice as to what the 
12 witness they may choose to call might say. I would hope you 
13 would ask Mr. Cole on the record if he received notice. 
14 THE COURT: This objection or the motion that was 
15 made that we addressed yesterday was at a pretrial conference 
16 yesterday that was made by Mr. Mack and there has been no 
17 motion made by Mr. Cole on behalf of Eliazar Babluene-Para. My 
18 ruling yesterday addressed the issues that were before me and 
19 my reconsideration will simply be addressing those issues. 
20 Mr. Cole may have the benefit of the record at a 
21 later time for anything he wishes to put on the record, but we 
22 are addressing this motion and this objection that was made by 
23 J defense counsel on behalf of Mr. Torres-Garcia. 
24 I When I ruled yesterday, it was on the very 
25 specific objection that the State had not complied with 
1 I 77-7-13.1(b)(ii)- I know that's a lengthy citation, but that 
2 is the very specific part of the code where a written 
3 explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to 
4 give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
5 testimony is required for expert testimony. It is clearly the 
6 underlying basis of the case law that in fairness before expert 
7 testimony can be Used, because of the very nature of expert 
8 testimony, there needs to be a sufficient opportunity for the 
9 opposing party to review, counter and prepare for expert 
10 testimony. That argument was made based on the fact that that 
11 is the required notice for expert testimony generally. 
12 There was argument made by the defense that they had 
13 not received a copy of the notice. There is one filed in the 
14 court and it appears on the surface of the filing that there 
15 clearly was notice given. My ruling yesterday addressed the 
16 fact that the notice was given and that the State was not going 
17 to be penalized for the fact that it may not have been 
18 disbursed through LDA. It is appropriate that if Mr. Cole 
19 I wishes to place on the record that he did not get it as well, 
20 the record still would reflect today that I am addressing 
21 subsection (ii), is what that is, as to the written 
22 explanation. 
23 My ruling was that the written explanation that had 
24 been given by the State simply referred to the name of the 
25 expert witness and that his testimony would be regarding drug 
1 trafficking. There was also attached the vitae of Mr. Watson, 
2 and that was the full extent of the notice that was given. I 
3 ruled upon the argument of the defense that a general statement 
4 that he would be testifying considering drug trafficking did 
5 not meet the requirement in sub (ii), that it needed to be 
6 sufficient explanation of the proposed testimony to give the 
7 opposing party adequate notice. 
8 The motion to reconsider is dealing specifically with 
9 the issue of whether or not that notice is required under these 
10 circumstances. The expert that is involved in this case is a 
11 State employee, and subsection 6 of that 77-17-13 statute 
12 clearly states that this section does not apply to the use of 
13 an expert who is an employee of the State, and then gives the 
14 restrictions that do apply there. 
15 The underlying issue here is notice. The underlying 
16 issue is, in fairness, has the opposing party had an 
17 opportunity to adequately and properly prepare for the 
18 testimony that the proposing party, the State in this case, 
19 wishes to get in through their expert witness, who they have 
20 characterized as an expert witness, Craig Watson. The 
21 restrictions in subsection 6 is that it needs to be reasonable 
22 enough through general discovery through other means so that 
23 they can adequately prepare. And that is the bottom line and 
24 the issue that I will rule on at this time. 
25 This issue has been involved in motions to suppress, 
1 it has been involved in discovery, it has been involved in 
2 yesterdayfs motion as to what Craig Watson would be testifying 
3 regarding drug trafficking. That is part of the theme of the 
4 State's proposed case that the underlying basis for this murder 
5 charge that we are dealing with today is the drug trafficking 
6 that was underlying it. 
7 I have heard these motions, I have addressed them at 
8 length, they have been argued, they have been briefed by the 
9 opposing party in this case, defense counsel for 
10 Mr. Torres-Garcia, and everyone is aware through general 
11 discovery and through motions what this general nature of the 
12 testimony that is being proffered through Craig Watson would 
13 be. 
14 The question still remains whether or not there has 
15 been reasonable notice. Because there was an objection made 
16 that it was not under the expert testimony general notice so 
17 that there could not be additional hearings requested or 
18 additional controverting expert testimony, I ruled that on 
19 subsection 2 that had not been met and the remedy was for more 
20 time, and the State elected to go forward without the use of 
21 that testimony. 
22 Now that subsection 6 has been brought to the court's 
23 attention and has been argued here, it is clear that the ruling 
24 that I made yesterday was based on a notice requirement that is 
25 not required as to the investigator Craig Watson. I am 
1 I modifying my ruling. The testimony of Craig Watson has been 
2 I clearly given through general discovery as well as through the 
3 motions that have been discussed at length in court and briefed 
4 at length in court. 
5 Also, this is the first day of what is scheduled to 
6 I be a four-day jury trial. I am going to order that the State 
7 not call that witness — I!m not going to allow that they call 
8 that witness until defense has had an opportunity to speak with 
9 him during the course of this trial. That may mean that the 
10 attorneys have to do some work outside of the trial time. That 
11 is simply a given in a homicide trial. 
12 This homicide trial now needs to be everyone's first 
13 priority. There are not going to be explanations given that 
14 attorneys need to be in different courts or that they didn't 
15 have an opportunity to speak with the witness. The witness is 
16 here, the witness is available, and I am ordering him available 
17 to all three of the defense counsel so that they may fully and 
18 completely brief him and get an understanding of what his 
19 testimony is and prepare for that cross-examination. 
20 But because subsection 6 clearly states that the rule 
21 in subsection 1(b) does not apply to this particular witness, I 
22 am modifying that order. But there still needs to be 
23 reasonable notice, there still needs to be a reasonable 
24 opportunity for the opposing party to prepare, and that is to 
25 occur this week during trial before I will allow Mr. Watson to 
1 be called to the stand. 
2 Ms. Bernards-Goodman, when does the State anticipate 
3 calling Mr. Watson? 
4 I MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: We did anticipate Mr. Watson 
5 would be our last witness, so if we get through everything 
6 quick, it will be the end of tomorrow, probably Wednesday. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
8 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: Thursday. 
9 THE COURT: With that proffer, then, the opposing 
10 parties are on notice that they need to get that preparation 
11 and discussion done tonight, and that will be expected. 
12 Is there anything else that we need to address on the 
13 record, Mr. Cole? 
14 MR. COLE: Yes, Your Honor. I didn't actually get 
15 notice of any expert witness or of Mr. Watson. Now, I wasn't 
16 involved in those motions at all and I haven't had a chance to 
17 even talk to Officer Watson. I don't know that a day is 
18 sufficient time for me to prepare, much less get a rebuttal 
19 J witness against Mr. Watson. Since he's a State expert, I 
20 object to it and would ask for a continuance of the trial. 
21 THE COURT: Any response, Ms. Go Bernards-Goodman? 
22 Was the notice sent to Mr. Cole's office and Mr. Smith's 
23 office? 
24 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: It's my understanding that 
25 everything we have sent on this case has gone to both offices. 
1 MR. COLE: And that!s not entirely true, Your Honor. 
2 For the CDs and tapes I was told when I showed up at the 
3 line-up for one of the defendants that we were, quote, unquote, 
4 Going to have to fight over who got a copy of them, ended up 
5 having to give Detective Prior copies or a blank audio tape and 
6 blank CD roms to get copies of those. So there is obviously a 
7 problem with discovery in this particular matter. 
8 THE COURT: It is the order of the court that you now 
9 I take advantage of the time that has been set and given, and 
10 Mr. Watson will not be called until the defense attorneys have 
11 I had an opportunity. As to the objections that that may not be 
12 enough time, this matter has been set for multiple pretrial 
13 hearings, Mr. Cole has not been present at those pretrial 
14 hearings and was not present at the hearing yesterday. The 
15 court is giving him as much notice as can reasonably be given 
16 under the circumstances, and that is the ruling in this case, 
17 the notice that is required in subsection 6. And I want that 
18 discussion to occur tonight before the State completes its case 
19 and gets to a point of its last witness. 
20 All right. I donft believe that there are any other 
21 motions that have been brought before me. Again, I have 
22 received a copy of the requested proposed jury instructions 
23 from the State. 
24 Mr. Mack or Mr. Fuelling, have you got any proposed 
25 jury instructions at this time? 
